The Monthly Roundup: Dr Raji Rajagopalan on China’s Cyber Reach into Space
ASPI’s Dr Rajeswari (Raji) Rajagopalan examines how China is weaponising cyber operations in orbit—and what it means for regional security.
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Welcome to another edition of The Daily Cyber & Tech Digest Monthly Update! Each month, an ASPI expert shares their top news picks and provides their own take on one key story. This time, Dr Rajeswari (Raji) Pillai Rajagopalan, Resident Senior Fellow with ASPI’s Cyber, Technology and Security Program, shares her perspective.
China’s Cyber Power Grab in Space
China is increasingly using cyber means to project power and influence in the space domain. Just weeks ago, Bloomberg News reported that Viasat—a major U.S. satellite communications company—had been targeted by Salt Typhoon, a Chinese government-linked cyber espionage group, during last year’s US presidential election campaign.
The breach was discovered earlier in the year, and the satellite telecommunications company has reportedly been working with the US government to investigate the incident. Similarly, in December last year, reports emerged that Verizon Communications, AT&T and Lumen Technologies had also been targeted in a hacking campaign attributed to Salt Typhoon. China’s sophisticated hack was aimed at capturing massive amounts of phone records, including those of the two presidential candidates.
Writing in The Strategist this March, ASPI’s James Corera and Elizabeth Buchanan warned not only of Salt Typhoon, but of an even bigger threat: Volt Typhoon. According to the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Volt Typhoon has already “compromised the IT environments of multiple critical infrastructure organisations—primarily in communications, energy, transportation systems, and water and wastewater systems sectors—in the continental and non-continental United States and its territories, including Guam.”
Both these groups were backed by the Chinese government.
China’s active pursuit of cyber weapons capable of disrupting satellite systems and other critical infrastructure requires continuous monitoring. Indo-Pacific states, including Australia, are increasingly aware of this. But to respond effectively, they will need more sophisticated tools to develop a shared threat picture and strengthen their collective cyber defenses.
China’s evolving approach to space is possibly a mix of its traditional ambitions in space to safeguard its interests (mostly focusing on civilian and developmental aspects) and its goals to achieve superiority in space. China is not alone in such pursuits but that does not offer any confidence about the ability to maintain space as a global common good. This underscores the urgency for like-minded states to develop advanced cyber, electronic warfare, and counterspace capabilities to counter China’s expanding use of space as a strategic domain. China’s strategy increasingly blends cyber and space-based capabilities to project power and shape regional outcomes below the threshold of armed conflict. One example is TIDRONE, a ‘Chinese-speaking’ threat actor, that reportedly began targeting Taiwanese military and space companies in April 2024.
Space is no longer a neutral or purely civilian domain—it has become central to economic competition, geopolitical influence and military strategy, with space playing the role of a force multiplier for achieving military superiority elsewhere. China’s now defunct Strategic Support Force (SSF), which combined space, cyber and electronic warfare, reflects the importance Beijing placed on integrating these domains in its national security strategy. But in April 2024, China disbanded and reorganised the SSF into three separate forces—the Aerospace Force, Cyberspace Force, and Information Support Force—directly under the Central Military Commission. This reflects the increasingly potent and elevated role for cyber and electronic warfare in Chinese military strategy, which should be concerning to the Indo-Pacific region.
At the tactical level, China has been developing and refining capabilities to disrupt its adversaries’ satellite systems, particularly those supporting command and control. According to a 2012 PLA textbook published by the Academy of Military Sciences—Lectures on the Science of Space Operations— Chinese military thinkers advocate for the use of ‘information blockades’ in space warfare, including the use of computer viruses and hacker intrusion to sabotage or paralyse enemy space systems. The text describes employing cyber nodes to conduct information theft, data tampering, and deception operations targeting adversary satellite networks—disrupting not just space assets but also associated weapons systems and communications infrastructure.
These capabilities are no longer theoretical. Chinese cyber attacks on satellites can be traced back to as early as in 2007 and 2008 when two U.S. satellites were compromised through a ground station in Norway. The US did not communicate who was behind it, but it stated that the nature of the attack pointed to China. The 2008 attack was considered particularly alarming because the hackers managed to complete all steps to gain control of the satellite although no harm was done. But these were early days, and China was possibly validating their technical capabilities, and also they were meant to send a political message to the U.S. that it has acquired such capabilities to create disruptions at will.
Counterspace capabilities are not new—they date back to the Cold War—but they’ve seen a resurgence over the past decade. What’s changed is the growing reliance on space-based systems in the conventional military space, which increases the risk of escalation, making today’s strategic environment significantly more volatile. As power dynamics shift and geopolitical tensions rise, more states may be willing to develop and deploy counterspace weapons.
Kinetic weapons like anti-satellite systems remain attractive, but many states including China are moving to develop electronic and cyber warfare means because they are cheaper and offer the added benefit of plausible deniability. The fact that these capabilities are often developed, deployed or even used without immediate detection is concerning. A further challenge lies in distinguishing between intentional attacks and technical malfunctions, an ambiguity that makes cyber weapons particularly tempting.
As the Viasat and Verizon breaches show, China’s growing use of cyber operations is picking up pace and it will have an impact on space operations too. It’s a signal to like-minded states that the next frontier of strategic competition is already here.
My must-reads
The National Interest
China’s maturing on-orbit satellite servicing capabilities demonstrate that it is able to repair as well as extend longevity of their satellites. Simply put, these capabilities allow for remote repair or refuelling of satellites that are in orbit, thus extending the life of a satellite. While this is mostly a defensive capability, there are concerns that it could be used for nefarious purposes amid intensifying geopolitical competition. What China achieved through this mission is a first of its kind—one Chinese satellite in geosynchronous orbit, the farthest orbit above the Earth refuelled another satellite.
Space News
Writing new rules of the road for space or other critical and emerging technologies has been challenging in today’s international political scenario. This OpEd offers some useful lessons from the Cold War years in how the United States and Soviet Union managed to avoid a hot war through a series of measures including through hotlines and transparency measures such as the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement that helped in avoiding accidental collisions or misreading certain manoeuvres.
United States Institute of Peace
This article examines the rise of China’s state-backed hacking groups, including Volt Typhoon and Salt Typhoon, and their evolution from traditional cyber espionage to more potent, disruptive attacks on U.S. critical infrastructure—such as telecommunications, energy, and space systems. These operations appear to be part of a broader Chinese strategy designed to achieve strategic surprise and secure a dominant position in the space domain.
For more on China's pressure campaign against Taiwan—including military threats, interference and cyberwarfare, check out ASPI’s State of the Strait Weekly Digest.
